SUPPORTING LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS’ AUTHORITY TO STOP AND PAT-DOWN FOR WEAPONS THOSE INDIVIDUALS FLEEING POLICE IN HIGH CRIME AREAS

NAPO represents 4,000 law enforcement organizations, with 250,000 sworn law enforcement officers (including police officers, deputy sheriffs, state troopers, highway patrol officers, and traffic enforcement personnel) and 3,000 retired officers. In Illinois, the PB&PA of Illinois represents several thousand police officers, including the Chicago Police Department Sergeants, Lieutenants, and Captains, and the IPA represents several thousand officers, including many Chicago officers.

Summary of NAPO’s Position

The brief was filed in support of Respondent State of Illinois and the Cook County State’s Attorney. The amici curiae seek to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, which had ruled in favor of the Respondent Sam Wardlow’s motion to suppress evidence seized from him, namely a loaded handgun. The Chicago police detained Wardlow and seized this handgun, after he inexplicably fled upon seeing police cars in a high crime area in Chicago (during anti-drug trafficking efforts).

"Law enforcement throughout the United States has a significant interest in the important issues in this case," said Robert T. Scully, NAPO’s executive director. "Sworn to enforce the law, officers must be able to investigate potential violations in those localities with a reputation for high crime," continued Scully. "Officers must be able to apply their common sense, rely on their experience in deciding what is suspicious behavior, and stop individuals for questioning whenever they have reasonable suspicions of criminal behavior by such individuals, including suspicious flight," said Scully. "Fleeing at the sight of a police officer--an obvious and extreme means of avoiding the police--is a strong common-sense indicator of a guilty conscience in the minds of both a reasonable police officer and an ordinary citizen, as a number of courts have found," continued Scully.

"Incredibly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that an individual’s precipitous flight from identifiable law enforcement officers, whether in or outside a high crime area, does not constitute a reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior, and thus officers may not stop and question a fleeing individual," said Scully. "A reasonable police officer charged with enforcing the law and maintaining peace cannot ignore the inference that criminal activity may be afoot. To do so would be a dereliction of duty with serious consequences to public order. Police cannot be expected to shrug their shoulders and look the other way at obvious and highly suspicious behavior," said Scully.

Scully continued, "If this decision is not reversed, then serious consequences would occur. Fewer individuals engaging in highly suspicious behavior would be questioned; fewer unlawfully possessed weapons would be found; more crimes would go unresolved; culpable individuals would commit even more crimes and victimize more persons; and, in the end, we would become a more dangerous society."

NAPO’s legal brief emphasized that, even if an individual’s flight by itself is not enough, the individual’s presence in a high crime area like Chicago Police District 11, combined with the flight, certainly gives rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior. In addition, the brief addressed an anticipated argument by an amicus curiae submitting a brief in support of Wardlow, which may assert that the "high crime" designation of an area heavily populated by individuals of a racial or ethnic minority is constitutionally impermissible, because it disproportionately targets minorities, even though it is based of numbers of reported crimes. Our brief asserted that, if the police should reduce their efforts in such areas, then the consequences, mentioned above, would be even more profound, particularly for the law-abiding residents of these neighborhoods who are the most victimized by crimes committed in their neighborhoods. Reducing protection for them would likely constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

In summary, NAPO’s and its member organizations amici brief provides the Supreme Court with meaningful insight into the compelling need for police officers to investigate a suspect’s flight upon seeing an officer, because such flight does constitute a reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior, both in high crime areas and other locales. The brief also discusses law enforcement’s responsibility to allocate resources to and be present in high crime areas, based on the first-hand experience of officers and also, if available, statistical evidence. The brief urges the Court to adopt a clear and simple rule authorizing investigative stops, based on reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior or danger to others whenever an individual suspiciously flees from the police.

Background of the Case

On September 9, 1995, Chicago Police Officer Timothy Nolan was assigned as part of a team to investigate narcotics sales in the Department’s 11^th District, a high crime area, focusing on West Van Buren Street, known to have "high narcotics traffic." In fact, according to Chicago Police Department statistics, District 11 ranked first in murder and robbery and second in aggravated assault and criminal sexual assault, out of all of the 25 police districts in the city in 1997.

On September 9^th, Officer Nolan was in full police uniform. He and seven other officers were driving eastbound on West Van Buren in four police vehicles. Officer Nolan then saw the Respondent, Sam Wardlow. Wardlow looked at the officers and "took off running" away from them, while carrying a bag under his arm. Officer Nolan pursued Wardlow, and eventually the officer and his partner were able to corner him a few blocks away. Nolan exited his vehicle and stopped Wardlow for the purpose of conducting a field interview. At the hearing, Nolan testified that it is common to find weapons in the vicinity where narcotics are sold. Therefore, without asking Wardlow any questions, the officer conducted a "protective pat-down" search "for [his] own safety." The officer squeezed the outside of the white opaque plastic bag that the suspect was holding under his arm and felt an object that was hard, heavy and similar in shape to a revolver. He then looked inside the bag and found a Colt .38 caliber handgun loaded with five bullets. The officer arrested Wardlow, who was subsequently convicted of the offense of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Wardlow’s conviction was reversed by the Illinois appellate courts on the ground that there was not sufficient reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that he had been or was engaged in criminal activity.

Key Points in the Amicus Brief

Under the constitutional standard established in Terry v. Ohio, an officer may stop and investigate unusual or suspicious behavior, when the officer reasonably believes that the individual is engaged in criminal activity. Fleeing at the sight of a police officer is an "objective manifestation" giving rise to an articulable suspicion that the fleeing individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. As such, it justifies a temporary detention of the individual, allowing the police officer to briefly investigate his or her suspicious behavior. Therefore, the Respondent’s sudden and unprovoked flight upon viewing Police Officer Nolan was sufficiently suspicious by itself to justify a temporary investigatory stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio. A reasonable police officer charged with enforcing the law and maintaining peace cannot ignore the inference that criminal activity may be afoot and should not be expected to look the other way.

In addition, characteristics of a geographic area may be taken into account in assessing the totality of suspicious circumstances. Consequently, an area’s reputation for criminal activity is an appropriate, articulable, and integral fact in determining whether an investigative detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Succinctly stated, the location where suspicious behavior occurs is highly relevant in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. Hence, even if the Court decides that suspicious flight from a police officer is not, by itself, sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, the fact that such flight occurred in a high crime area is an additional element which should be determinative. Thus, fleeing in a high crime area supports a reasonable suspicion and justifies an investigative detention.

The reputation of an area for having substantial criminal activity can be based, not only on the objective knowledge and experience of police officers, but on verifiable and quantifiable data. Sophisticated geographic data collection and analysis systems have all become an essential part of crime prevention. Determining which locales or neighborhoods are high crime areas, and knowing what types of crimes are prevalent in those areas, results in a more efficient allocation of resources and thus more effective law enforcement, as was occurring in this case.

Chicago Police District 11, where the Respondent fled from the police, is such a high crime area. In 1997, District 11 had a higher overall total crime rate than 13 of the 25 police districts, roughly an equal crime rate to two of the districts, and a lower crime rate than nine of the districts. When broken down further, this data reveals that in 1997, District 11 had the highest number of murders and robberies, and the second highest number of criminal sexual assaults and aggravated assaults, of all the police districts in Chicago. This data clearly indicates that District 11 is a high crime area.

The ability to quantify reports of crime refutes any claim that the police disproportionately or discriminatorily target areas that have large ethnic or racial minority populations, thus causing those areas to have higher-than-average arrest statistics, an argument which we anticipate may be posited by an amicus curiae expected to be filed by the ACLU and the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers on behalf of the Respondent. Any such assertion is erroneous for all for the following reasons: first, victim reports and calls for service are factored into the data; and, second, research demonstrates that not all minority neighborhoods suffer from high crime and victimization and that high crime also exists in other neighborhoods. This is certainly the case in Chicago. The Chicago data set forth in this brief demonstrates that neighborhoods in Chicago, as elsewhere, do not have to be predominately populated by racial or ethnic minorities in order to be labeled as high crime areas.

Thus, when patrolling any of these locales, a Chicago police officer would take into account that he or she is, in fact, in a high crime area, when considering the totality of the circumstances applying to a particularly suspicious individual. This rebuts insinuations that using area as a factor in determining reasonable belief has a discriminatory effect on racial or ethnic minorities. If anything, the opposite is true. While objective statistics do show that many high crime areas are found in urban neighborhoods with large racial or ethnic minority populations, data also show that the minority residents of these neighborhoods are much more concerned about crime and have higher victimization rates than any other demographic group. In fact, crime prevention efforts targeting specific neighborhoods have served as an invaluable tool in providing the residents of these communities with the protection that they not only desire, but so rightly deserve. To reduce law enforcement in these neighborhoods would subject law-abiding residents to increasing victimization and would be a denial of the equal protection of the laws.

In summary, the totality of circumstances demonstrates a reasonable suspicion that Wardlow was engaged in criminal behavior, and justifies the investigative detention of the Respondent. Therefore, the subsequent search and arrest of the Respondent were valid under the Fourth Amendment.

FOR A COPY OF THE BRIEF, CALL JODY COUSER AT THE NAPO OFFICE (202) 842-3560.